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ABSTRACT
Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosities of welfare states, differ significantly across
countries. In this paper, we test whether there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on
individual preferences. We exploit the "experiment" of German separation and reunification to
establish exogeneity of the economic system. From 1945 to 1990, East Germans lived under a
Communist regime with heavy state intervention and extensive redistribution. We find that, after
German reunification, East Germans are more in favor of redistribution and state intervention than
West Germans, even after controlling for economic incentives. This effect is especially strong for
older cohorts, who lived under Communism for a longer time period. We further find that East
Germans' preferences converge towards those of West Germans. We calculate that it will take one














Are individual policy preferences exogenous or are they endogenous to political regimes?
We focus in particular on tastes for redistribution and redistributive policies which in
fact diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries.1 Are the regimes diﬀerent solely because of
diﬀerent initial preferences for redistribution in the populations? Or is there a feed-
back eﬀect from the regime on preferences? Is it possible that living under a speciﬁc
system leads to adaptation of preferences?2
In order to analyze these questions empirically, one needs an exogenous shock to
the regime; post war Germany oﬀers an opportunity to analyze the eﬀect of Commu-
nism on people’s preferences. From 1945 to 1990, Germany was split into two parts
for reasons that had nothing to do with Germans’ desire for separation, or diversity
of tastes between East Germans and West Germans: the division of Germany into
two parts was exogenous with respect to underlying individual preferences. Since the
political and economic system has been the same in the eastern and western parts of
Germany since reuniﬁcation in 1990, and was the same before 1945, West Germans
constitute a meaningful control group for East Germans. Therefore, comparing the
diﬀerences in attitudes and preferences of Germans after the reuniﬁcation can give us
ac l u ea b o u tt h ee ﬀects of living for 45 years under a Communist regime on attitudes,
beliefs and political preferences.
We are especially interested in measuring how 45 years of Communism aﬀected
individuals’ thinking toward market capitalism and the role of the state in providing
insurance and redistribution from the rich to the poor. If political regimes had no
eﬀect on individual preferences, one should not observe any systematic diﬀerences
between East and West Germans after reuniﬁcation. If Communism had an eﬀect, in
1For instance, the diﬀerence between Europe and the US has been discussed recently by Alesina
and Glaeser (2004).
2Several recent theoretical papers have shown that there is scope for multiple equilibria and self-
fulﬁlling beliefs in redistributive policies (see e.g. Piketty 1995, Alesina and Angeletos 2005, and
Benabou and Tirole 2005).
2principle one could think of two possible reactions to 45 years of Communist dictator-
ship. One is that people turn strongly against the “state” and switch to preferences
in the opposite direction, namely in favor of libertarian free markets, as a reaction
to an all intrusive state. The opposite hypothesis is that 45 years of heavy state
intervention and indoctrination instill in people the view that the state is essential
for individual well being. As we shall see, we quickly and soundly reject the ﬁrst
hypothesis in favor of the second. In fact, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of Communism are
large and long lasting. It will take about one to two generations for former East and
West Germans to look alike in terms of preferences and attitudes about fundamental
questions regarding the role of the government in society.
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀect of Communism on intrinsic preferences. This eﬀect
could arise because of Marxist Leninist indoctrination, state control over school, press,
or state television, etc. Also, simply becoming accustomed to an all encompassing
state may make people think of it as necessary and preferable despite the suﬀocating
aspects of the East German regime. Beside this eﬀect, there exists a purely economic
eﬀect, which arises because Communism has made former East Germany relatively
poorer than former West Germany. Since the poor disproportionately beneﬁtf r o m
government redistribution, they favor it. We ﬁnd evidence of both types of eﬀects.
We also investigate why former East Germans are more likely to favor state inter-
vention (beside the economic eﬀect). One reason is that they are simply used to it.
Another reason is that East Germans believe much more so than West Germans that
social conditions, rather than individual eﬀort and initiative, determine individual
fortunes; this belief is of course a basic tenet of the communist ideology. The more
one thinks that it is society’s “fault” if one is poor, unemployed or sick, the more one
is in favor of public intervention. We ﬁnd evidence for both eﬀects.
Last, we analyze whether preferences of East Germans converge towards those of
West Germans, given that they now live under the same regime West Germans have
experienced since 1945. We calculate that, under the strict assumption of linearity, it
3w i l lt a k ea b o u t2 0t o4 0y e a r st om a k et h ed i ﬀerence between East and West Germans
disappear almost completely, due to the combination of two forces. One is the dying
of the elderly and the coming of age of individuals born after reuniﬁcation; the other
is the actual change of preferences of any given individual. We estimate the ﬁrst
eﬀect to account for about one third of the convergence eﬀect and the second one to
account for the remaining two thirds of the convergence.
An implication of all of the above is that Germany in 1990 has been subject to a
major political shock, perhaps with deeper and longer lasting consequences than the
widely studied economic shock associated with the reuniﬁcation.3
The question of preferences for redistribution and diﬀerent visions about the wel-
fare state has recently received much attention. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss
the origin of diﬀerent beliefs and preferences in the US and Continental Western Eu-
rope, and in fact place a lot of weight on the inﬂuence of Marxist ideology on the
preference for redistribution in Europe versus the US. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
and Fong (2003) investigate the connection between views about social mobility and
preferences for redistribution using US data. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) consider
Russian data. In general, this literature ﬁnds that the more individuals perceive that
there is social mobility the less favorable they are to government redistribution.
The paper most closely related to ours is Corneo (2001). Building on Corneo and
Grüner (2002), he studies empirically what motivates individuals to favor redistrib-
ution, from purely individual to altruistic motives. In examining this issue, Corneo
(2001) compares preferences in the US, West Germany and East Germany. One of
his results is that East Germans are more favorable to redistribution than West Ger-
mans, who, in turn, are more favorable to it than Americans. More generally, in a
comparison of six Eastern European and six Western countries, Corneo and Grüner
(2002) ﬁnd large country ﬁxed eﬀects for Eastern European countries; i.e. they ﬁnd
3Giavazzi and McMahon (2005) have recently pointed out how the German reform process in
fact is lacking political support from the people.
4that Eastern Europeans have stronger preferences for redistribution than individuals
from Western countries. Corneo (2001) as well as Corneo and Grüner (2002) use data
from the 1992 round of the International Social Survey Programme. We can expand
on their analyses since we use a panel data set that includes many more individual
controls. By using diﬀerent waves of our data, we can discuss more precisely tim-
ing issues and speed of convergence of preferences. By focusing on Germany, we can
distinguish more clearly the role of Communism in shaping preferences from other po-
tential reasons why Eastern Europeans might favor redistribution. That is, it could be
that preferences in Eastern Europe are diﬀerent because of diﬀerent cultures, histories
etc. even before the advent of Communism. Moreover, a more uncertain environment
and absence of insurance markets could induce Eastern Europeans to favor redistri-
bution.4 Last, we analyze preferences a decade after the transition started. At this
point, it is harder to argue that uncertainty about future economic conditions was
larger in East Germany than in the West. Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) conduct
public goods and solidarity experiments with East and West German subjects and
detect signiﬁcantly diﬀerent behavior between both groups, which they attribute to
the eﬀects of Communism in East Germany versus Capitalism in the West on norms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional back-
ground, and the data. In Section 3 we present our basic results concerning preferences
for state intervention in social policy. Section 4 investigates related attitudes about
the role of individual responsibility versus social conditions in determining success in
life. These attitudes can potentially explain diﬀerences in preferences regarding the
welfare state. The last section concludes.
4These two reasons (in addition to language issues) make the interpretation of results from cross-
country studies especially hard. Other cross-country studies that analyze the legacy of Communism
on attitudes towards free markets and labor markets are Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (1991, 1992),
and Blanchﬂower and Freeman (1997). The eﬀect of Communism on religious beliefs is studied
by McCleary and Barro (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2005). They ﬁnd that Communism has
signiﬁcant and potentially long lasting negative eﬀects on individual religiosity and on the adoption
of state religions.
52 Institutional background and data
2.1 Institutional background
2.1.1 German separation and reuniﬁcation
Germany as a country was created in 1871 as a result of the political uniﬁcation of
18 independent political units of various size, the largest and most powerful being
Prussia. Germany remained a single country until the end of the Second World War
when, as a losing power, it was split amongst the winning Allies. East Germany was
under the sphere of inﬂuence of the Soviets, while the West was occupied by the US,
F r a n c e ,a n dt h eU K .T h eb o r d e r sb e t w e e nE a s ta n dW e s tG e r m a n yw e r et h er e s u l to f
bargaining between the Allies and the position of the occupying forces at the end of
hostilities. In 1949, both the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) were oﬃcially founded. The East German regime devel-
oped as one of the most rigid of the former Communist regimes. Income inequality
in the GDR was low: in 1988, the average net income of individuals with a univer-
sity degree was only 15% higher than that of blue collar workers, compared to 70%
in the FRG. Also, intersectoral diﬀerences in net incomes were minimal, on average
amounting only to 150 Mark per month with an average monthly income of around
1100 Mark in 1988 (Stephan and Wiedemann, 1990, Schäfgen, 1998). Reuniﬁcation
occurred rather quickly and abruptly in October 1990, 11 months after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989. East Germany became part of the Federal Republic
of Germany, and the economic and political system of the West was transferred to
the East.
2.1.2 Germany before 1945
One important identifying assumption of our analysis is that East and West Germany
were indistinguishable until the exogenously imposed separation in 1945. Because of
this, if we observe diﬀerences in attitudes of East and West Germans after reuniﬁ-
6cation, we can attribute them to 45 years of Communism. How reasonable is the
assumption that East and West Germans were indistinguishable in terms of their
attitudes before 1945? Table A1 shows average per capita income levels of diﬀerent
German regions, as well as subregions of Prussia, in 1928, 1932, and 1936. We mark
a region by E or W, depending on whether it mainly belonged to the GDR or FRG
between 1949 and 1990. Unmarked regions do not belong to Germany after 1945.5
As the table shows, the level of income per capita in pre-World War II Germany does
not show any systematic diﬀerence between East and West; in fact, on average they
a r ea l m o s ti d e n t i c a l . 6 Moreover, destruction during World War II was major and
universal in both the later FRG and GDR.
However, income per capita aside, there might have been diﬀerences in attitudes
before 1945. One possible issue is that Prussians might have had a more militarist
“state-centric” view about the state than other Germans. Note however that part of
former Prussia belonged to the FRG and part to the GDR between 1949 and 1990,
and not all regions of the later GDR belonged to Prussia (see Table A1). We address
the issue of Prussia explicitly in section 3.
The period of the “Weimar Republic” (1918 to 1933) enhanced conformity between
t h eG e r m a nr e g i o n s .Y e t ,a l r e a d yb e f o r et h a ta tt h et u r no ft h el a s tc e n t u r y ,t h el a t e r
East and West Germany were quite similar along many economic dimensions, e.g.
with regard to the percentage of the population working in industry, agriculture,
or commerce (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1898, pp. 224-233).7
Moreover, in the elections of 1898, around the same number of constituencies in the
5Note that some regions transcend the borders established after World War II, in which case we
assign the region to East, West or outside Germany depending on its largest share.
6The non-population weighted average income in later East regions amounted to 1,203 Mark in
1928, 877 Mark in 1932, and 1,169 Mark in 1936, while the corresponding incomes for the later West
regions are 1,203, 913, and 1,200 Mark.
7The perception that the territory of the GDR was diﬀerent (e.g. more agricultural) than the
West before 1945 seems to be caused by the fact that the far Eastern part of Germany in the borders
before 1945 was indeed much more rural. Yet, this refers to the regions that after 1945 belonged to
Poland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia, not to the GDR.
7later East and West Germany voted primarily in favor of the Social Democrats. In the
West, the largest party was the Zentrum party, which was more in support of state
intervention than the Conservatives, which was the most prominent party beside the
Social Democrats in the East (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1899,
pp. 246-247). Hence, it seems that, if anything, the West was at that time more in
favor of state intervention than the East.
2.1.3 East-West migration between 1945 and 1989
From a peak population of 19.1 million people living in 1947 in the Soviet zone that
oﬃcially became the GDR in 1949, around 3 million people emigrated into the FRG
before the Berlin Wall was built in August 1961 (Rytlewski and Opp de Hipt, 1987,
Storbeck, 1963, Heidemeyer, 1994).8 From August 1961 to December 1988, only
slightly more than 600,000 people emigrated from East to West (Schumann et al.,
1996). The large number of East-West migrants before 1961 is in contrast to only
around 30,000 people per year emigrating from West to East in the 1950s, and almost
no West-East emigration after 1961 (Münz and Ulrich, 1997). Migration poses a
challenge to our identiﬁcation, since it raises the possibility of self-selection: if the
distributions of preferences for state intervention were identical in East and West
before 1945, but migration after 1945 was largely driven by these preferences, then
this could explain why we would observe stronger preferences for state intervention
in the East in the 1990s.
The sociological literature acknowledges six main reasons for East-West migration,
namely ﬂeeing from the Soviet army (Hiergebliebene), returning after having been
displaced during the war, migration to the West via the East of emigrants from parts
of the former German Reich not belonging to Germany any more after 1945, political
reasons, migration of individuals who suﬀered from expropriation and other economic
discrimination, and general economic reasons. While extensive survey evidence on
8The reported numbers are estimates based on diﬀerent data sources. Data of migration ﬂows
before 1949 are especially unreliable.
8the reasons of migration does not exist, it is widely believed that family reunions
and the economic prosperity of the West were the two main reasons for migration
(see e.g. Heidemeyer, 1994, and Storbeck, 1963). Although surely preferences for
s t a t ei n t e r v e n t i o np l a y e dar o l ef o rm i g r a t i o n ,i ti sn o tc l e a rt h a tt h i sm o t i v ei ss t r o n g
enough to explain any observed diﬀerences in preferences between East and West
Germans after reuniﬁcation. Moreover, the number of emigrants is probably not
large enough to explain large diﬀerences in preferences afterwards. Last, if stronger
preferences for state intervention in the East than in the West would be caused
exclusively by self-selection, then this diﬀerence should be persistent over time after
reuniﬁcation; in fact it is not, as we shall see.
2.2 Data
The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual household panel, started
in West Germany in 1984. From 1990 on, it also covers the territory of the former
German Democratic Republic. We use the original sample established in 1984, and
the sub-sample covering the territory of the former GDR started in 1990. The original
West German sample leaves us with around 11,400 year-person observations, while
the East German sample covers around 7,000 year-person observations for 1997 and
2002.9
In 1997 and 2002, respondents were asked questions concerning their preferences
for the role of the state in diﬀerent areas of social security. The question reads: “At
present, a multitude of social services are provided not only by the state but also by
private free market enterprises, organizations, associations, or private citizens. What
is your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for the following areas?”. We use
the answers to all areas that concern ﬁnancial security, namely “ﬁnancial security in
case of unemployment”, “ﬁnancial security in case of illness”, “ﬁnancial security of
families”, “ﬁnancial security for old-age”, and “ﬁnancial security for persons needing
9The numbers of observation vary slightly with the dependent variable.
9care”.10 The answers are given on a scale of 1 to 5, which correspond to “only the
state”, “mostly the state”, “state and private forces”, “mostly private forces”, and
“only private forces”. We group the ﬁrst 2 answer categories together to represent
individuals with preference for an active role of the state in providing for its citizens,
and group the last 3 answer categories together to represent individuals with pref-
erences for private forces. Hence, we create 5 new dummy variables which take on
the value of 1 if the respondent answered “only the state” or “mostly the state” for
the respective area, and 0 otherwise. This is mainly done to ease the interpretation
of the coeﬃcients. As a robustness check, we run ordered probit regressions on the
original variables, and the results do not change signiﬁcantly.11 Table A2 reports the
summary statistics of our newly created variables.12
Our explanatory variable of main interest is an East dummy that takes on the
value of 1 if the respondent lived in East Germany before reuniﬁcation, regardless
of the current place of residence. Hence, this dummy captures people who lived
under Communism before 1990. The baseline controls include age, gender, marital
status, labor force status, education, and occupation of the respondent, the number of
children and the number of adults in the household, as well as the annual household
income. All monetary variables are in 2002 DM.
We analyze two additional questions that capture the belief of the respondent
regarding important driving forces of success in life. In 1996 and 1999, GSOEP asked
the following question: “The following statements express varying attitudes towards
life and the future. Please state whether you totally agree, agree slightly, disagree
slightly, or totally disagree”, followed by several statements that diﬀer between 1996
and 1999. The ﬁrst statement we use refers to the role of luck in life. We create a
dummy variable “luck” that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent agreed totally or
10The questions of interest hence capture diﬀerent areas of state intervention associated with
redistribution and insurance.
11The basic results using ordered probits are shown in Table A5. All other results are available
from the authors upon request.
12Table A3 reports summary statistics for the independent variables.
10slightly with the statements “No one can escape their fate, everything in life happens
as it must happen” in 1996 and “What one achieves in life is mainly a question
of luck or fate” in 1999.13 Similarly, the dummy variable “social conditions” takes
on the value 1 if the respondent agreed totally or slightly with the statement “The
possibilities in my life are determined by the social conditions”.14 The answers to
these questions are also summarized in Table A2.
Table A4 shows income per capita and unemployment rates in German states
(Bundesländer) in 1997 and 2002, as well as transfers per capita that each state
receives fromother states and the federal government in line with the German ﬁnancial
transfer system (see the appendix for an overview of the German transfer system).
Average income per capita in the East is around 80% of the average West income,
and the unemployment rate is roughly twice as large. As we discussed above, before
WWII per capita income levels in East and West Germany were virtually identical.
The 20 percent diﬀerence in per capita income after reuniﬁcation can be interpreted
as the eﬀect of 45 years of diﬀerent economic and political experiences on economic
development. The lower income levels as well as the higher unemployment rates lead
t ot h ef a c tt h a ta l le a s t e r nG e r m a ns t a t e sa r en e tr e c i p i e n t so ft r a n s f e r s .A m o n gt h e
western German states, ﬁve are net givers, while four are net recipients. Yet, with the
exception of the small state of Bremen, the average transfer received is much larger
in the East than among the net recipients in the West.
3B a s i c r e s u l t s
Table 1 reports results from our basic speciﬁcation, in which we include as explanatory
variables many individual characteristics and our variable of interest, being from the
East. As we discussed above, the left hand side variable is deﬁned as a 0/1 variable
with 1 meaning support for an active state role. We also rerun all these regressions
13We take the average of both questions to alleviate potential measurement error.
14This question was asked in 1999. There is no equivalent statement in 1996.
11using the entire ﬁve point scale, and the results are consistent. Table A5 in the
appendix is the same as Table 1, but the left hand side variable has the ﬁve point
scale, and an ordered probit estimation is conducted. In the main text, we report the
results from probit regressions for ease of interpretation.15
The ﬁrst three explanatory variables are the critical ones; and for all ﬁve questions
they behave similarly. Consider column 1, which concerns unemployment. An East
German is signiﬁcantly more likely to have preferences for state provision of ﬁnancial
security for the unemployed than a West German. Over time, however, the East
Germans are becoming less pro state, since the interaction between being from the
East and the 2002 dummy (the third variable) is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The dummy variable of being an East German and the interaction of that with
2002 have similar coeﬃcients on all questions. The coeﬃcients on the East indicator
variable vary from 0.37 to 0.43, and are hence rather uniform. The interaction of
East with 2002 (a rough measure of convergence) varies from -0.06 to -0.18. The
economic meaning of these numbers is as follows. Being from the East increases the
probability of favoring state intervention by between 14.5 and 17 percentage points
in 1997, compared to being from the West. Between 1997 and 2002, the probability
of favoring state intervention for an East German declines by between 2.3 and 6.9
percentage points. Given that these questions are reported at a 5 year interval (1997
and 2002), a very rough measure of convergence would imply full uniformity of views
from a minimum of about 11 years (column 5) to a maximum of 35 years in column 3.
Given that the ﬁrst survey was taken 7 years after reuniﬁcation, the complete cycle
of convergence (assuming that it is linear) would be between roughly 20 and 40 years,
depending on the question; roughly one to two generations.16
15The coeﬃcients reported in the tables are the total coeﬃcients. We report the corresponding
marginal coeﬃcients in the text when we are interpreting the size of the coeﬃcients. The marginal co-
eﬃcients of interaction variables are calculated as the cross partial derivatives (Ai and Norton, 2003).
The marginal eﬀect on y of a dummy variable x has been calculated as E [y|x =1 ]− E [y|x =0 ] .
16Our results are based on unweighted observations. If we use the sample weights provided by
GSOEP, the results are very similar. The only diﬀerence worth mentioning is that the convergence
results become on average weaker, indicating an even longer process of convergence. However, when
12The dummy for 2002 captures the change in preferences of a West German be-
tween 1997 and 2002. Note that it is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that westerners
are becoming more pro government, for 3 of the 5 regressions. In none of the ﬁve
regressions is there signiﬁcant evidence that West Germans are becoming less pro
government.
The estimates on individual controls yield reasonable results. Men are generally
less pro government (although not consistently on all questions). Larger families,
both in terms of number of children and number of adults, are more favorable to
government intervention, not surprisingly, since they get more beneﬁts. Interestingly,
civil servants have weaker preferences than others for government intervention for the
unemployed, probably because they have very high job security. On the contrary,
those who are unemployed strongly prefer government intervention for unemployed.
Income enters negatively and is statistically signiﬁcant on all questions; the wealthy
beneﬁt less from government intervention and pay more for it. Similarly, college
educated individuals favor private forces over the state. Self employed are less pro
government either because they beneﬁt less from redistribution, or because being self
employed is correlated with a more individualistic vision of the world and/or with
less risk aversion (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005).17 All these variables are
always included as controls in all the regressions, and the coeﬃcients are quite stable.
From now on, we do not report them to avoid cluttering the tables.
The data set also includes two variables which proxy for wealth. One is the amount
of interest and dividend income obtained by the household of the respondent; the
second is whether or not the household owns the house it lives in. The inclusion
of these controls might be important, since preferences regarding insurance provided
by the state might be inﬂuenced by the possibilities to self-insure through private
we include wealth variables as controls (as described at the end of this section), the convergence
results are again very similar to the unweighted results.
17All these results on individual controls are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the US by
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
13wealth holdings. When we add these variables in the regressions, the results on the
East-West diﬀerences remain however almost unchanged. The coeﬃcients on the
two wealth variables have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. These
results are reported in Table 2. We do not include these two wealth controls in our
basic regressions because of data availability. After the inclusion of these variables,
we lose around 2,200 observations because of non respondence. We checked all our
results including these two variables, in addition to those of Table 1, and the results
are robust.18
To make sure that we capture the eﬀect of having lived in the East, and not the
eﬀect of being “Prussian”, we also include a “Prussia-dummy” as a control into our
regressions. This dummy takes on the value of 1 if in the spring of 1990 the individual
lived in a region that historically belonged to Prussia.19 The deﬁnition of a region
here is the Raumordnungsregion of residence. There are 97 Raumordnungsregionen
in Germany in 1990, of which 23 are in the East, and 42 have assigned the value of
1 for the “Prussia-dummy”.20 The estimates of the “Prussia-dummy” are sometimes
positive and sometimes negative, but never signiﬁcant.21 Moreover, its inclusion does
not change any of the results. Hence, we conclude that we do not capture the eﬀect
of being “Prussian”, but rather the eﬀect of having lived under Communism.
3.1 Age and cohort eﬀects
Let us now consider more closely the eﬀects of the number of years under Communism
on individual preferences. Table 3 shows some striking results.22 Consider column
1. The variable “age” corresponds to the age of the respondent. The East indicator
18T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
19We use Prussia in its borders from 1871 to 1914.
20We assign the value of 1 to a Raumordnungsregion, if the major part of its territory belonged
to Prussia. As explained in section 2.1.2, not all Raumordnungsregionen of the East belonged to
Prussia, and some Raumordnungsregionen of the West did belong to Prussia.
21Results are available from the authors upon request.
22In the regressions of this table we do not include the variables age squared and age cubed to
facilitate the comparison of the age eﬀect.
14variable interacted with age is positive, meaning that older former East Germans
are more favorable to state intervention. Note how age not interacted with East
is negative, meaning that West Germans are becoming less pro government as they
become older, the same result found for the US by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
The eﬀect of age on preferences is exactly opposite in East and West. The same
pattern applies to all other questions. The obvious interpretation of these strikingly
diﬀerent age patterns between East Germans and West Germans is that while age
tends to make individuals less pro government in West Germany, this eﬀect is more
than compensated by the fact that elderly East Germans have lived longer under
Communism.
Table 4 pushes this age analysis further by looking at ﬁve diﬀerent groups of birth
cohort. The ﬁve groups are deﬁned as follows: born after 1975, born between 1961
and 1975, born between 1946 and 1960, born between 1931 and 1945, and born on or
before 1930. Note that the youngest group did only spend their childhood and early
adolescence under Communism; this is the omitted group in the regressions. This
table shows that the older are progressively more pro government than the younger
in the East, a pattern not observed in the West, in which in fact the older tend to be
less pro government than the younger. Interestingly, for some of the questions the old
rather than the oldest group in the East shows the maximum support of government.
Note that the individuals born on or before 1930 lived a signiﬁcant part of their life
before Communism was introduced.
The quantitative implications of the birth cohort eﬀects are large. Figure 1 rep-
resents the results from Table 4 in a diﬀe r e n tw a y ;i ts h o w sb yh o wm a n yp e r c e n t a g e
points an East German of a certain cohort group is more likely to favor state inter-
vention than a West German of the same cohort group. While an East German from
the youngest group is only between 3 (column 4) and 11 (column 1) percentage points
more likely to be in favor of government redistribution than a West German of the
same group, an East German born on or before 1930 is between 21 percentage points
15(column 1) and 49 percentage points (column 4) more likely than a West German of
the same cohort group to believe in government redistribution.
3.2 Decomposition of change over time
Given that we observe that older East Germans are more in favor of redistribution
than younger ones, the question arises whether the observed decline in East Germans’
preferences for redistribution between 1997 and 2002 is simply a result of a shift in
the cohort composition, or whether it is caused by changing personal preferences of
East Germans. Even if personal preferences were constant over time, we would expect
that East German preferences converge on average to West German preferences as
older East Germans die and East Germany becomes populated by relatively younger
households who have spent less time of their life under Communism.
To investigate the relative importance of both eﬀects, in Table 5 we report results
from the baseline regressions in which we include only individuals who answer the
relevant questions in both 1997 and 2002.23 Hence, all changes in preferences between
1997 and 2002 are due to changing personal preferences, and not due to changes in
the cohort composition. The interaction eﬀect between East and year 2002 is still
negative in all 5 regressions, and signiﬁcant in all cases except ﬁnancial security of
families (column 3). However, the East time eﬀect is now on average substantially
smaller than in the baseline regressions; in absolute terms, it is increasing by 1% in
column 1, up to declining by 63% in column 3. On average, the East time eﬀect is
35% smaller than the eﬀect reported in the baseline results in Table 1. Hence, we
conclude that around two thirds of the convergence arises from actual convergence of
preferences, while around one third arises from changes in the cohort composition.24
T h ef a c tt h a tw eﬁnd signiﬁcant actual convergence of preferences points against the
23Note that we use an unbalanced sample for the general results.
24The number of observations drops by around 24% if we restrict the sample to those individuals
who answer in both 1997 and 2002. Note that the cohort results from Table 4 are consistent with
the conclusion from this section that one third of the convergence over time can be attributed to
the shifting cohort composition.
16hypothesis that the East eﬀect is only due to self-selection of individuals into the
West before 1961, and that individual preferences are stable over time.
3.3 The eﬀect of Communism: Poverty or preferences?
3.3.1 Individual economic eﬀects
The poor tend to favor government intervention more than the rich. In our regressions,
we always include the logarithmic household income of the respondent as a control,
and the coeﬃcient on this variable is always negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Hence, we are measuring the eﬀects of having been in the East controlling for the fact
that the respondent’s income might be lower precisely because he or she lived in the
East. In order to allow for further non-linearities between income and preferences, we
also include a fourth order polynomial of household income instead of the logarithm
of household income, and our estimates remain virtually unchanged.25
In order to capture the extent to which a household currently beneﬁts from re-
distribution, in Table 6 we split household income up by its sources and include the
logarithms of diﬀerent income components as explanatory variables.26 The ﬁrst eight
sources of income reported in Table 6 are based on government support (e.g. pension
income, unemployment beneﬁt, maternity beneﬁt), while the last four listed sources
of income are private (e.g. wage income, and income from self-employment). One
would expect a negative eﬀect of income on preferences for state intervention mostly
for this last group. Indeed, the coeﬃc i e n t sf o rt h i sg r o u pa r ea l m o s ta l w a y sn e g a -
tive, and often signiﬁcant. This is especially true for wage income and income from
self-employment. On the other hand, the coeﬃcients on government income sources
are mostly positive, and sometimes signiﬁcant. Hence, we ﬁnd that individuals who
currently beneﬁt from government interventions favor these interventions or are at
25Results are available from the authors upon request.
26Since almost all of the respondents report zero income for at least one of the categories, we
add DM 10 of annual income to every category for every observation before we take the logarithm.
Results are unchanged if we instead add DM 1 or DM 100, or if we include the incomes from diﬀerent
sources in levels and squared.
17least indiﬀerent to them, while income from private sources has a negative eﬀect on
preferences for state intervention. Most importantly, the inclusion of these variables
leaves the estimated East eﬀects almost unchanged, and makes them even slightly
stronger.
In addition to current income, expected future income may explain preferences
for redistribution; individuals who expect to rise in the social ladder may oppose
redistributive policies which might remain in place for several years.27 As a rough
measure of the eﬀects of expected future income, assuming perfect forecasts, we check
whether the growth in income of a respondent between 1997 and 2002 aﬀects his/her
preferences in 1997. The future growth rate of income between 1997 and 2002 has a
negative eﬀect on preferences in 1997, but again its inclusion leaves the estimates of
the East dummy almost unchanged (Table 7).
3.3.2 Aggregate economic eﬀects
In addition to personal income, however, there might be an aggregate income eﬀect;
individuals living in regions poorer than average may prefer government intervention
because of the active redistribution from richer to poorer regions, which in fact takes
place in Germany.
In Table 8 we include as additional controls the average per capita income and
unemployment rate of the state of residence, as well as transfers received or paid by the
state; note that we continue to include as always the income of the respondent. The
level of per capita income turns out never to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect.28 The regional
unemployment rate has a weak positive inﬂuence on preferences for state intervention;
it is only signiﬁcant in the question regarding the unemployed. Financial transfers
have signiﬁcant positive predictive power for preferences for state intervention for
the unemployed, as well as for people requiring care. After including these three
27On this point see Benabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
28Results are almost unchanged if we include the logarithm of the average per capita income,
instead of the level.
18regional controls, in the regression regarding the unemployed the coeﬃcient on the
East indicator variable drops from 0.43 to 0.29. This suggests that part of the East
eﬀect estimated above had to do with East German states beneﬁtting ﬁnancially from
redistribution. A similar pattern occurs with all the other questions. Thus, up to one
third of the ”East eﬀect” can be explained by the fact that the East became poorer
during Communism and is now a net beneﬁciary of redistribution within Germany,
rather than to an eﬀect of Communism on preferences. The respondents’ preferences
for public intervention are inﬂuenced by economic eﬀects in the region where they
live, but even after controlling for that, we still ﬁnd a large eﬀect of being from the
East.
3.4 Migration and preferences
So far, we have treated all East Germans as one homogeneous group. Yet, 7 percent
of East Germans in our sample have migrated to the West. In Table 9, we add
the dummy variable “East living in East”, which takes on the value of 1 if an East
German lives in the territory of the former East Germany in the observation year,
and 0 otherwise.29
The coeﬃcient on the East-dummy now captures the preferences of an East Ger-
man living in the West. As the table shows, East Germans living in the West are more
in favor of government intervention than West Germans. However, East Germans liv-
ing in the East are at least twice as much in favor of government intervention than
East Germans who moved to the West. This result can be interpreted in two ways.
First, it could be that, having lived among West Germans for some time, preferences
29We also estimated a model in which we include instead a dummy variable “East residence” that
takes on the value of 1 if the respondent lives in the East in the observation year, regardless of
whether the respondent is from the former East or the former West, as well as interactions of this
variable with the East dummy, the year 2002 dummy, and their interaction (results are available
from the authors upon request). While this is a better modeling approach, the interpretation of the
results is more complicated. Since only 0.6% of theW e s tG e r m a n si no u rs a m p l el i v ei nt h eE a s t ,w e
hence decided to refrain from splitting the West Germans according to current residence. Results
do not change signiﬁcantly.
19of East Germans who moved to the West have converged faster than preferences of
East Germans who stayed in the East. Second, those who migrated to the West
could be a self-selected group that had lower preferences for state intervention to
begin with.30
With regard to convergence, one can observe that all the convergence in prefer-
ences between 1997 and 2002 is driven by East Germans who stayed in the East. The
preferences of East Germans who moved to the West do not change in a statistically
signiﬁcant way between 1997 and 2002. Again, there are several possible explanations
for this phenomenon. It could be that preferences of East Germans who moved to
the West converged initially, but that they have reached their new steady-state level
by 2002. In this case, we should not necessarily expect full convergence either for
East Germans staying in the East. On the other hand, it could be that those East
Germans who moved to the West not only had diﬀerent preferences at the time of
migration, but that their preferences also exhibit diﬀerent convergence patterns. In
the case of preferences regarding ﬁnancial security when unemployed and ﬁnancial
security of old individuals and families, East Germans who moved to the West even
become more pro state over time, although this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant;31
this might be interpreted as a backlash of preferences after experiencing life in the
West.
3.5 Diﬀerences across regions and along other attributes
In order to gain further insides whether the measured eﬀect really captures the eﬀect of
Communism, we analyze the homogeneity of the eﬀect along diﬀerent attributes. We
would expect the eﬀect of Communism to be relatively homogeneous across eastern
states, as well as across diﬀerent groups of the population (e.g. male vs. female
individuals). Hence, we would be worried if the “East” eﬀect on preferences were
30Note e.g. that the average age of East respondents who moved to the West is 34, while the
average age of East respondents who stayed in the East is 45.
31The associated p-values are 0.17, 0.38 and 0.95.
20very heterogeneous, and especially if we only detected it in one or two single states,
or in speciﬁc groups of the population.
First, we rerun our baseline regression including separate dummies for all 5 eastern
states plus East Berlin instead of one single East dummy. Note that, consistent
with the East dummy, these dummies refer to the state of residence at the time of
reuniﬁcation. As the results in Table 10 show, the coeﬃcients on the eastern state
dummies are positive and signiﬁcant in all states. Moreover, they are of similar size
across the states. The only slight outlier that emerges is the state of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, which is in 4 out of 5 cases more pro private forces than the other eastern
states, although it is still relatively pro-government compared with West Germany.
With regard to convergence, the results are a little bit more heterogeneous. However,
only 5 out of 30 coeﬃcients on the interaction term between an East German state
and the year 2002 turn out not to be negative, while 15 of the 30 coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly negative. Every state shows signiﬁcant convergence in at least 1 of the
5q u e s t i o n s .
We redo this exercise on the even smaller units of Raumordnungsregionen (see
section 3).32 While many of the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant, which is not surprising
given the smaller number of observations per unit, the results are quite homogeneous
across the regions.33
To analyze the homogeneity of the eﬀect of Communism on preferences across
diﬀerent groups, we create interactions of all the independent variables with the East-
dummy, and include all interaction terms as further controls.34 Thus, we can test
whether the eﬀect of a certain characteristic on preferences for state intervention is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the East from the eﬀect in the West. Strikingly, the only
characteristic for which this is consistently the case is age, as we would expect and
32Results are available from the authors upon request.
33The only outlier that emerges is the region Prignitz, which always has an insigniﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient on its dummy variable, and shows convergence only in 2 out of the 5 categories.
34Results are available from the authors upon request.
21detected before (see the analysis in section 3.1). Only 8 out of the other 105 coeﬃcients
on interaction terms (21 interaction terms in 5 regressions) are statistically signiﬁcant,
but never consistently across the ﬁve diﬀerent regressions.35
Thus, we conclude that the eﬀect of Communism on preferences is homogeneous
across eastern states, and across diﬀerent groups of the East German population
(with the exception of age groups). This makes it even more likely that we capture
the eﬀect of Communism, rather than some aggregate or individual economic eﬀects,
given that the experience of transition has not been uniform across eastern regions
and diﬀerent population groups.
4 Social conditions, individual eﬀort and luck
Why do former East Germans favor state intervention? One possibility is that they
are used to think (partly because of the inﬂu e n c eo fC o m m u n i s ti d e o l o g y )t h a ti ti s
“society’s fault” if people are poor, unemployed or in need of help. If the individual is
not responsible, but society is, then society (i.e. the state) should take care of these
problems.
In Table 11 we report a regression in which the left hand side is a variable that takes
the value of 1 if the respondent believes that social conditions determine individual
possibilities in life. In column 1, we ﬁn das t r o n ge ﬀect of being from the East. The
probability of believing in the inﬂuence of social conditions is 11 percentage points
higher for an East German than a West German. In the next column we interact the
East indicator variable with the age of the respondent and ﬁnd, once again, a strong
age eﬀect.36 Older East Germans are more likely to believe in social conditions as
major determinants of individual fortunes than younger East Germans. We interpret
35Being married has a statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀect in East and West in two out of the
ﬁve regressions, as has belonging to the group of "other nonworking". For being male, self-employed,
retired, or having intermediate or technical school as highest education, this is the case in only one
out of the ﬁve regressions. The results are unchanged whether we include higher order terms of age
(and their interactions) or not.
36As in table 3, we omit higher order terms of age as controls in this regression.
22this as the eﬀect of having lived longer under a Communist regime. In the West, the
age eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Table 12 however shows that the eﬀect of having lived in the East goes well beyond
these beliefs about social conditions. In this table (where as always we control for
all individual characteristics), we repeat the baseline regression including the dummy
variable capturing beliefs in an important role of social conditions as control. While
the variable capturing the beliefs about social conditions has a signiﬁcantly positive
inﬂuence on preferences for an active state role, the East indicator variables are still
signiﬁcant and only slightly smaller than in the baseline results in Table 1. Thus,
even after controlling for beliefs regarding social conditions, former East Germans
believe in state intervention more than former West Germans.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) ﬁnd that those who
believe that luck determines wealth and success in life are more pro redistribution
than those who belief that mostly individual eﬀort is responsible for success.37 We
pursue this line here as well. Table 13 shows a regression in which the left hand
side variable is deﬁned as 1 if the respondent believes that luck determines individual
fortunes. The East indicator variable is now negative. If we put this result together
with that of Table 11, it appears that East Germans believe more than West Germans
that individuals (being their eﬀort or their luck) matter less than social conditions in
determining success or failure in life. Column 2 shows no age eﬀect for East Germans
b e y o n dt h ep o s i t i v ea g ee ﬀect also observed for West Germans.38 Table 14 shows that
those who belief that luck matters a lot in determining individual success are more
favorable to government intervention. Not surprisingly, given the lower belief in the
role of luck by East Germans, the inclusion of this variable has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the east indicator variable.
37Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2005) present models seeking to explain
the equilibrium redistributive policies as a function of individual beliefs about luck and eﬀort as
determinants of success.
38Again, we omit higher order terms of age as controls in this regression.
235 Final remarks
We ﬁnd that East Germans are much more pro-state than West Germans. According
to our results, it will take about one to two generations (20 to 40 years) for an
average East German to have the same views on state intervention as an average
West German. The diﬀerence in preferences between former East and West Germans
i sd u ei nl a r g ep a r tt ot h ed i r e c te ﬀect of Communism. This eﬀect could arise due to
indoctrination, e.g. in public schools, or simply due to becoming used to an intrusive
public sector. A second, indirect eﬀect of Communism is that by making former East
Germany poorer than West Germany, it has made the former more dependent on
redistribution and therefore more favorable to it.
Former West Germany has then received a major “political shock”, in the sense
that the new members of the uniﬁed Germany are much more favorable to state inter-
vention. This shock has potentially long-lasting eﬀects, since we ﬁnd that preferences
need one to two generations to converge.
In evaluating these results, one always has to wonder whether or not survey an-
swers are meaningful, namely whether they reﬂect what individuals truly believe
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). We are quite conﬁdent that they truly reﬂect
preferences for two reasons. First, the basic correlations of the answers with variables
like income, wealth, and labor force status are consistent with obvious individual
cost/beneﬁt analyses. Second, evidence on voting behavior in East and West over the
observation period is consistent with the picture emerging from this survey. Table
A6 shows the share of votes obtained by various parties in the diﬀerent states in the
elections for the federal parliament (Bundestagswahlen) in 1998 and 2002. In this
table, the parties are ordered from left to right to coincide with their position in the
political spectrum. Thus, the ﬁrst column shows the vote share per state of the most
leftist party, the PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) ,w h i c hi si ne ﬀect the
successor party of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the ruling
24party in the GDR. In 1998, the percentage of votes received by this party was about
20 per cent in the East, but only around 1 to 2 per cent in the West; it was around
10 per cent in Berlin, which includes both former East and former West Berlin. This
is consistent with our ﬁnding of a much more pro state, left leaning population in the
East, as captured by the survey. Also, comparing the 2002 and 1998 elections, we see
how the percentage of the PDS votes in the East shrinks substantially, presumably
in favor of the SPD, the main center left party, whose share increases almost iden-
tically to the reduction in votes for the PDS. This indicates a movement away from
the communist leaning left toward the center of the political spectrum, and shows
a convergence of the East to the West. This voting behavior is therefore consistent
with the preferences regarding state intervention expressed by the respondents of the
survey.
In summary, we provide evidence that individuals’ preferences are rather deeply
shaped by the political regime in which they live.
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27Appendix
A German regional transfer system
German federalism is a complicated structure, with many legislative areas and taxes
shared between the federal government and the states. Realizing the diﬀerent eco-
nomic powers of the states, the need for an equalization scheme was written down
in the West German constitution in 1949. In 1993, federal and state governments
reformed the system to administer massive monetary ﬂows into the new eastern Ger-
man states. The new system (Solidarpakt I) was established in 1995, and scheduled
to expire at the end of 2004. In response to the still signiﬁcant economic needs of the
eastern German states, the federal and state governments negotiated an extension of
the system (Solidarpakt II) in 2001, which started to become eﬀective in 2005 and is
scheduled to expire at the end of 2019. Through the new system, the eastern German
states will receive a total of 306 billion DM (i.e. 156 billion Euro) over a period of 15
years.
The ﬁnancial equalization scheme between the federal government and the states
(Länderﬁnanzausgleich) comprises a horizontal and a vertical component. In the hor-
i z o n t a lc o m p o n e n t ,t h eﬁnancial needs and ﬁnancial resources of any given state are
determined via speciﬁc formulas. Based on these calculations, it is decided whether
a given state should receive extra ﬁnancial resources, or should share its resources
with other states. The ﬁnancial ﬂows between the states in this step sum up to
zero.39 In the subsequent vertical component, certain states receive additional ﬁnan-
cial resources from the federal government (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). On top
of that, since 1995 the eastern German states have received special support from the
federal government based on the “law for the promotion of investment in eastern Ger-
many” (Investitionsförderungsgesetz Aufbau Ost). Last, the debt of the East German
government was taken over by the western German states. This led to annual interest
and amortization payments by only the western states (Fonds Deutsche Einheit). In
Table A4, we report the transfers per capita in DM for every state in 1997 and 2002,
adding the vertical and the horizontal component of the Länderﬁnanzausgleich,a s
well as the ﬂows based on the Investitionsförderungsgesetz40 and the Fonds Deutsche
Einheit.41
39In a preceding step, the receipts from value added taxes are divided between the states. 75% of
the receipts are divided based on the number of inhabitants, while 25% of the receipts are divided
according to a formula that takes the ﬁnancial needs of the states into account. Hence, this procedure
leads to some implicit ﬂows between states. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain the amounts
of these implicit transfers.
40Since 2002, these ﬂows have become part of the Bundesergänzungszuweisungen, and hence they
have only been added in 1997.
41Note that results are unchanged when we omit the Fonds Deutsche Einheit in calculating the
transfers.
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Table 1: Basic regression 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.432  0.030  0.434  0.028  0.420  0.028  0.426  0.028  0.371  0.028 
year02   0.064  0.023  0.165  0.023  -0.012  0.024  -0.033  0.023  0.103  0.023 
east*year02  -0.123  0.039  -0.161  0.036  -0.060  0.036  -0.143  0.036  -0.176  0.036 
                       
age   -0.026  0.015  -0.005  0.015  -0.009  0.015  -0.019  0.014  -0.003  0.014 
age squared  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
age cubed  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
college  -0.203  0.064  -0.258  0.061  -0.141  0.062  -0.277  0.061  -0.122  0.060 
vocational training  -0.096  0.057  -0.140  0.054  -0.136  0.055  -0.163  0.054  -0.087  0.054 
secondary schooling  -0.101  0.059  -0.071  0.056  -0.023  0.057  -0.103  0.056  -0.068  0.056 
intermediate schooling  -0.103  0.069  -0.152  0.066  -0.147  0.068  -0.155  0.065  -0.052  0.065 
male   -0.083  0.023  -0.072  0.022  -0.003  0.022  -0.020  0.022  0.020  0.021 
number of children  0.034  0.014  0.034  0.012  0.064  0.012  0.038  0.012  0.010  0.012 
number of adults  0.022  0.013  0.043  0.012  0.022  0.011  0.037  0.011  0.007  0.012 
married   0.069  0.039  0.106  0.037  0.026  0.037  0.045  0.036  0.109  0.036 
divorced   0.089  0.052  0.048  0.051  0.042  0.050  0.047  0.050  0.107  0.049 
married but separated  0.011  0.087  -0.028  0.083  -0.042  0.083  0.082  0.084  0.161  0.084 
widowed   -0.050  0.060  0.027  0.058  -0.043  0.059  -0.038  0.057  0.075  0.057 
log(household income)  -0.156  0.027  -0.264  0.025  -0.135  0.025  -0.224  0.025  -0.148  0.025 
civil servant   -0.122  0.057  -0.222  0.059  0.085  0.059  -0.060  0.059  -0.113  0.055 
self-employed   -0.317  0.052  -0.403  0.053  -0.332  0.053  -0.450  0.053  -0.306  0.051 
white-collar worker  -0.030  0.033  -0.044  0.032  0.011  0.032  -0.089  0.031  -0.101  0.031 
unemployed   0.161  0.051  0.005  0.047  0.142  0.047  0.005  0.046  -0.034  0.046 
retired   -0.075  0.059  -0.090  0.057  0.149  0.058  0.019  0.056  0.011  0.056 
maternity   0.015  0.080  -0.051  0.077  0.119  0.075  -0.197  0.077  -0.081  0.075 
nonworking   -0.027  0.043  -0.022  0.042  0.158  0.042  -0.012  0.041  0.021  0.041 
training   -0.049  0.066  -0.021  0.063  -0.115  0.065  -0.086  0.063  -0.021  0.063 
other nonworking  -0.000  0.052  -0.093  0.049  0.062  0.049  -0.046  0.049  -0.097  0.049 
constant  1.994  0.303  1.852  0.293  0.728  0.293  1.859  0.291  1.178  0.287 
                       
obs  18,489    18,487    18,485    18,516    18,514    
log likelihood  -11,060     -12,192     -11,954     -12,250     -12,568    
 Note: Probit regressions. Omitted categories are less than 9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and employed. 
  
Table 2: Basic regression with asset controls 
 
Responsibility for 
the financial security 
when unemployed 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.412  0.032  0.404  0.030  0.399  0.030  0.406  0.030  0.357  0.030 
year02   0.088  0.025  0.180  0.025  -0.009  0.026  -0.005  0.025  0.125  0.025 
east*year02  -0.129  0.041  -0.155  0.039  -0.067  0.039  -0.146  0.038  -0.195  0.039 
                      
log(household asset income)  -0.029  0.009  -0.030  0.009  -0.017  0.009  -0.049  0.039  -0.028  0.009 
own house  -0.080  0.023  -0.062  0.023  -0.153  0.023  -0.119  0.023  -0.113  0.023 
age   -0.028  0.016  -0.023  0.016  -0.018  0.016  -0.035  0.016  -0.021  0.016 
age squared  (*10
3)  0.681  0.328  0.510  0.317  0.433  0.321  0.750  0.316  0.331  0.314 
age cubed (*10
3)  0.004  0.002  -0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.002  -0.005  0.002  -0.002  0.002 
college  -0.208  0.071  -0.225  0.067  -0.135  0.068  -0.264  0.067  -0.080  0.066 
vocational training  -0.115  0.064  -0.129  0.061  -0.140  0.062  -0.160  0.060  -0.047  0.060 
secondary schooling  -0.143  0.066  -0.072  0.062  -0.045  0.064  -0.104  0.062  -0.051  0.062 
intermediate schooling  -0.091  0.076  -0.125  0.072  -0.150  0.075  -0.139  0.072  -0.021  0.072 
male   -0.102  0.024  -0.076  0.023  -0.008  0.023  -0.023  0.023  0.014  0.023 
number of children  0.035  0.015  0.039  0.013  0.077  0.013  0.050  0.013  0.018  0.013 
number of adults  0.024  0.014  0.044  0.012  0.037  0.012  0.045  0.012  0.013  0.012 
married   0.062  0.041  0.117  0.039  0.028  0.039  0.050  0.039  0.126  0.038 
divorced   0.058  0.058  0.045  0.057  0.037  0.057  0.005  0.057  0.093  0.055 
married but separated  -0.096  0.102  -0.112  0.098  -0.002  0.097  0.030  0.098  0.184  0.097 
widowed   -0.056  0.065  0.020  0.062  -0.062  0.064  -0.055  0.062  0.098  0.061 
log(household income)  -0.129  0.030  -0.244  0.029  -0.092  0.029  -0.169  0.028  -0.103  0.028 
civil servant   -0.094  0.059  -0.198  0.061  0.084  0.061  -0.020  0.061  -0.082  0.057 
self-employed   -0.260  0.055  -0.356  0.056  -0.322  0.058  -0.431  0.057  -0.254  0.054 
white-collar worker  -0.016  0.035  -0.028  0.034  0.013  0.034  -0.072  0.033  -0.091  0.033 
unemployed   0.181  0.057  0.028  0.053  0.150  0.053  0.047  0.053  -0.035  0.052 
retired   -0.072  0.063  -0.119  0.061  0.130  0.062  0.028  0.060  0.005  0.060 
maternity   -0.008  0.087  -0.010  0.065  0.105  0.082  -0.207  0.086  -0.033  0.084 
nonworking   -0.015  0.047  -0.008  0.045  0.155  0.045  0.012  0.045  0.023  0.044 
training   -0.008  0.072  -0.003  0.069  -0.093  0.071  -0.063  0.069  0.043  0.068 
other nonworking  0.027  0.055  -0.065  0.053  0.064  0.053  -0.005  0.053  -0.061  0.053 
constant  2.010  0.334  2.128  0.325  0.626  0.324  1.928  0.320  1.198  0.317 
                       
obs  16,260    16,257    16,255    16,282    16,278    
log likelihood  -9,762     -10,683     -10,458     -10,693     -11,020    
Note: Probit regressions. Omitted categories are less than 9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and employed. 
  
Table 3: Regressions with east*age interaction 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.029  0.064  -0.034  0.060  -0.032  0.060  -0.226  0.060  0.002  0.059 
year02   0.070  0.023  0.172  0.023  -0.006  0.024  -0.024  0.023  0.108  0.023 
east*year02  -0.139  0.039  -0.176  0.036  -0.074  0.037  -0.168  0.036  -0.189  0.036 
                     
age  -0.000  0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.003  0.001  -0.003  0.001  -0.005  0.001 
east*age  0.009  0.001  0.011  0.001  0.010  0.001  0.015  0.001  0.008  0.001 
                       
obs  18,489    18,487    18,485    18,516    18,514    
log likelihood  -11,034     -12,148     -11,914     -12,165     -12,541    
Note:  Probit regressions. Included as controls are number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and dummies for education, 




Table 4: Regressions with cohorts interacted with east  
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.318  0.068  0.246  0.063  0.147  0.064  0.081  0.064  0.205  0.064 
year02   0.066  0.026  0.162  0.026  -0.045  0.027  -0.066  0.026  0.105  0.025 
east*year02  -0.111  0.039  -0.137  0.037  -0.033  0.037  -0.107  0.036  -0.156  0.036 
                     
born 1961-1975  0.014  0.074  0.018  0.070  -0.204  0.072  -0.215  0.072  -0.027  0.070 
born 1946-1960  -0.092  0.100  -0.061  0.095  -0.431  0.097  -0.391  0.096  -0.086  0.094 
born 1931-1945  -0.064  0.127  -0.105  0.122  -0.488  0.124  -0.517  0.123  -0.092  0.120 
born before 1931  -0.008  0.155  -0.104  0.149  -0.420  0.151  -0.467  0.151  -0.006  0.146 
born 1961-1975*east  -0.106  0.075  -0.007  0.071  0.120  0.071  0.128  0.072  0.012  0.071 
born 1946-1960*east  0.169  0.077  0.180  0.072  0.286  0.073  0.314  0.073  0.152  0.073 
born 1931-1945*east  0.356  0.081  0.392  0.075  0.501  0.076  0.643  0.076  0.365  0.076 
born before 1931*east  0.303  0.099  0.458  0.091  0.454  0.090  0.754  0.091  0.391  0.090 
                       
obs  18,489    18,487    18,485    18,516    18,514    
log likelihood  -11,021     -12,152     -11,905     -12,162     -12,534    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
  
Table 5: Regressions with individuals who answer in 1997 and 2002 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    0.446 0.035 0.394 0.033 0.407 0.033 0.391 0.033 0.333 0.033 
year02    0.052 0.026 0.164 0.026 -0.032 0.027 -0.048 0.026 0.095 0.025 
east*year02  -0.124 0.043 -0.109 0.040 -0.022 0.040 -0.067 0.039 -0.130 0.040 
                    
obs  14,110  14,110  14,110  14,110  14,110    
log  likelihood  -8,414  -9,321  -9,131  -9,323  -9,576    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
 
 
Table 6: Regressions with income sources 
  
Responsibility for 




the financial security 
when sick (state=1)
Responsibility for 
the financial security 
of the family 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for 
the financial security 
when old (state=1)
Responsibility for 
the financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    0.448 0.030 0.468 0.028 0.437 0.028 0.459 0.028 0.396 0.028 
year02    0.050 0.023 0.146 0.023 -0.023 0.024 -0.055 0.024 0.089 0.023 
east*year02  -0.128 0.039 -0.176 0.037 -0.069 0.037 -0.145 0.036 -0.184 0.036 
pension  income  0.007 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 
widow/orphan  pension  -0.011 0.009 -0.012 0.009 -0.011 0.009 -0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 
short-term  unemployment  benefit  0.012 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.006 -0.007 0.006 
long-term  unemployment  benefit  0.006 0.010 0.004 0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.009 0.009 -0.006 0.009 
support  for  training/education  0.000 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.026 0.010 0.020 0.010 
maternity  benefit  0.000 0.010 0.012 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 
student  grant  0.022 0.014 0.021 0.013 0.003 0.012 -0.000 0.013 0.031 0.013 
military  compensation  0.009 0.014 0.000 0.013 -0.007 0.013 -0.003 0.013 0.022 0.013 
wage  income  -0.010 0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.017 0.004 -0.009 0.004 -0.009 0.005 
income  from  self-employment  -0.022 0.006 -0.026 0.006 -0.024 0.006 -0.026 0.006 -0.014 0.006 
income  from  additional  employment  -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.010 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.017 0.006 
payments  from  persons  not  in  household  -0.010 0.010 -0.003 0.010 0.014 0.010 -0.014 0.010 -0.002 0.010 
                
obs  18,122  18,122  18,122  18,149  18,147    
log  likelihood  -10,832    -11,993    -11,708    -12,029    -12,320    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, and dummies for education, sex, marital 
status, employment status, and occupation. Income source variables are in logs.  
 
Table 7: Regressions with future income 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 




Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east    0.429  0.036  0.380  0.034  0.407  0.034  0.381  0.034  0.319  0.034 
future log(income) change  0.012  0.041  -0.123  0.040  -0.032  0.040  -0.062  0.040  -0.065  0.040 
                     
obs  7,404    7,402    7,399    7,412    7,411    
log likelihood  -4,390     -4,814     -4,802     -4,895     -4,990    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
 
Table 8: Regressions with aggregate regional variables  
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.293  0.050  0.330  0.047  0.367  0.047  0.313  0.047  0.235  0.046 
year02   0.091  0.031  0.209  0.030  -0.001  0.031  -0.004  0.030  0.115  0.030 
east*year02  -0.138  0.041  -0.164  0.038  -0.070  0.038  -0.143  0.038  -0.173  0.038 
                     
state income  0.009  0.009  -0.013  0.009  0.007  0.009  -0.009  0.009  -0.002  0.009 
state unemployment  0.014  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.007  0.004  0.007  0.003  0.007 
transfers  (*10
3)  0.042  0.022  -0.010  0.021  0.015  0.021  0.016  0.021  0.054  0.021 
                       
obs  18,488    18,486    18,484    18,515    18,513    
log likelihood  -11,046     -12,186     -11,950     -12,244     -12,555    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
  
Table 9: Regressions with residence  
                     




Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east  0.076  0.090  0.204  0.089  0.221  0.089  0.202  0.088  0.130  0.088 
east living in East  0.383  0.092  0.246  0.090  0.212  0.090  0.239  0.089  0.258  0.089 
year02   0.064  0.023  0.165  0.023  -0.013  0.024  -0.033  0.023  0.103  0.023 
east*year02  0.160  0.117  -0.070  0.111  0.100  0.114  0.007  0.107  -0.085  0.113 
(east living in East)*year02  -0.302  0.119  -0.092  0.113  -0.169  0.114  -0.157  0.108  -0.092  0.114 
                       
obs  18,489    18,487    18,485    18,516    18,514    
log likelihood  -11,052     -12,187     -11,951     -12,246     -12,562    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 




Table 10: Regressions with east states interacted with year02 
 




Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
East Berlin  0.442  0.091  0.537  0.083  0.477  0.082  0.375  0.082  0.449  0.083 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  0.265  0.068  0.290  0.064  0.253  0.064  0.300  0.063  0.390  0.064 
Brandenburg  0.399  0.062  0.341  0.057  0.416  0.057  0.457  0.057  0.371  0.057 
Sachsen-Anhalt  0.503  0.059  0.519  0.052  0.452  0.052  0.520  0.052  0.446  0.052 
Thüringen  0.553  0.060  0.407  0.053  0.405  0.052  0.416  0.052  0.311  0.052 
Sachsen  0.416  0.047  0.475  0.043  0.465  0.042  0.428  0.042  0.347  0.042 
                     
year02  0.067  0.023  0.162  0.023  -0.015  0.024  -0.037  0.023  0.097  0.023 
East Berlin * year02  -0.048  0.127  -0.376  0.107  0.020  0.109  -0.026  0.109  -0.137  0.110 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern * year02  0.086  0.099  -0.005  0.092  0.066  0.089  0.010  0.088  -0.178  0.090 
Brandenburg * year02  -0.023  0.085  -0.029  0.075  0.025  0.072  -0.134  0.075  -0.229  0.075 
Sachsen-Anhalt * year02  -0.130  0.079  -0.226  0.069  -0.110  0.071  -0.213  0.068  -0.220  0.070 
Thüringen * year02  -0.457  0.075  -0.138  0.070  -0.096  0.068  -0.123  0.070  -0.010  0.067 
Sachsen * year02  -0.063  0.061  -0.200  0.056  -0.106  0.055  -0.185  0.054  -0.207  0.056 
                       
obs  18,286    18,283    18,283    18,312    18,311    
log likelihood  -10,919    -12,042    -11,812    -12,098    -12,414    
Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 



















































Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
 
Table 11: Regressions with social conditions as the dependent variable 
 
BASIC REGRESSION  REGRESSION INCLUDING 
AGE*EAST INTERACTION 
Dependent variable:   
Social conditions define possibilities 
(agree=1) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.292  0.032  -0.186  0.085 
age*east      0.011  0.002 
age   0.008  0.022  0.002  0.002 
age squared  -0.000  0.000     
age cubed  -0.000  0.000     
college  -0.097  0.097  -0.116  0.093 
vocational training  -0.073  0.089  -0.077  0.085 
secondary schooling  -0.030  0.091  -0.024  0.089 
intermediate schooling  -0.033  0.104  -0.038  0.103 
male   -0.145  0.031  -0.145  0.031 
number of children  0.018  0.017  0.022  0.017 
number of adults  0.047  0.015  0.048  0.015 
married   -0.035  0.051  -0.039  0.047 
divorced   0.037  0.072  0.036  0.069 
married but separated  0.009  0.125  0.014  0.124 
widowed   0.127  0.084  0.128  0.083 
log(household income)  -0.140  0.037  -0.135  0.037 
civil servant   -0.181  0.076  -0.178  0.076 
self-employed   -0.266  0.070  -0.267  0.069 
white-collar worker  -0.027  0.044  -0.032  0.044 
unemployed   0.159  0.068  0.152  0.068 
retired   -0.121  0.086  -0.126  0.073 
maternity   0.028  0.112  0.018  0.112 
nonworking   0064  0.059  0.051  0.059 
training   0.049  0.095  0.049  0.093 
other nonworking  -0.161  0.071  -0.169  0.070 
constant  1.201  0.439  1.390  0.322 
           
obs  8,580    8,580    
log likelihood  -5,412     -5,394    
Note: Probit regressions. Omitted categories are less than 9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and employed. 
 
Table 12: Regressions with social conditions as a control variable 
 




Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.421  0.032  0.423  0.030  0.412  0.030  0.406  0.030  0.334  0.030 
year02   0.050  0.025  0.154  0.024  -0.026  0.026  -0.041  0.025  0.093  0.024 
east*year02  -0.131  0.041  -0.145  0.038  -0.051  0.038  -0.108  0.038  -0.136  0.038 
                     
social conditions  0.075  0.024  0.087  0.023  0.089  0.023  0.087  0.023  0.073  0.023 
                       
obs  16,197    16,202    16,199    16,224    16,222    













































Note: Probit regressions. Included as controls are cubic function in age, number of children and number of adults in household, logarithm of household income, and 
dummies for education, sex, marital status, employment status, and occupation. 
Table 13: Regressions with luck as the dependent variable 
BASIC REGRESSION  REGRESSION INCLUDING 
AGE*EAST INTERACTION 
Dependent variable: 
Life achievements determined by luck (agree=1) 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   -0.273  0.031  -0.402  0.081 
age*east      0.003  0.002 
age   -0.109  0.020  0.011  0.002 
age squared  0.002  0.000     
age cubed  -0.000  0.000     
college  -0.864  0.094  -1.009  0.091 
vocational training  -0.223  0.084  -0.359  0.080 
secondary schooling  -0.134  0.086  -0.230  0.084 
intermediate schooling  -0.186  0.097  -0.227  0.097 
male   -0.149  0.030  -0.143  0.030 
number of children  0.032  0.016  0.015  0.016 
number of adults  0.068  0.014  0.074  0.014 
married   0.037  0.050  -0.045  0.046 
divorced   0.075  0.069  -0.016  0.066 
married but separated  0.182  0.117  0.103  0.115 
widowed   0.195  0.078  0.103  0.076 
log(household income)  -0.406  0.036  -0.403  0.036 
civil servant   -0.357  0.085  -0.374  0.085 
self-employed   -0.145  0.070  -0.166  0.070 
white-collar worker  -0.173  0.043  -0.197  0.043 
unemployed   -0.015  0.062  -0.019  0.062 
retired   -0.079  0.080  -0.035  0.068 
maternity   -0.287  0.112  -0.278  0.112 
nonworking   -0.056  0.055  -0.016  0.054 
training   -0.370  0.092  -0.263  0.090 
other nonworking  -0.374  0.070  -0.314  0.069 
constant  4.586  0.419  2.972  0.311 
           
obs  9,753    9,753    
log likelihood  -5,700     -5,717    
Note: Probit regressions. Omitted categories are less than 9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and 
employed. 
 
Table 14: Regressions with luck as a control variable 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   0.432  0.030  0.442  0.029  0.430  0.028  0.435  0.028  0.375  0.028 
year02   0.061  0.023  0.160  0.024  -0.022  0.025  -0.039  0.024  0.102  0.023 
east*year02  -0.134  0.040  -0.142  0.037  -0.046  0.037  -0.119  0.037  -0.157  0.037 
                     
luck  0.038  0.024  0.135  0.023  0.077  0.023  0.114  0.023  0.067  0.023 
                       
obs  17,532    17,535    17,530    17,559    17,558    
log likelihood  -10.510     -11,540     -11,331     -11,600     -11,906    Figure 1: By how many percentage points is an East German of a certain birth 
cohort group more likely to favor state intervention than a West German of the 





































Table A1: Average per capita income 1928, 1932, and 1936 by region 
  
  
1928           
 (in 1928 Mark) 
1932  
(in 1928 Mark) 
1936 
(in 1928 Mark) 
Prussia  1,174  869  1,161 
  Provinz East-Prussia  814  673  849 
  Stadt Berlin (E/W)  1,822  1311  1,895 
  Provinz Brandenburg (E)  1,140  917  1,158 
  Provinz Pommern  921  721  967 
  Grenzmark Posen/West-Prussia  837  649  781 
  Niederschlesien  1,057  804  953 
  Oberschlesien  850  599  758 
  Sachsen (E)  1,155  844  1,161 
  Schleswig-Holstein (W)  1,164  938  1,192 
  Hannover (W)  1,069  859  1,156 
  Westfalen (W)  1,080  755  1,045 
  Hessen-Nassau (W)  1,226  963  1,140 
  Rheinprovinz (W)  1,218  857  1,171 
       
Bayern (W)  1,041  785  1,049 
Sachsen (E)  1,423  964  1,270 
Württemberg (W)  1,183  1015  1,348 
Baden (W)  1,135  859  1,117 
Thüringen (E)  1,095  784  1,087 
Hessen (W)  1,158  797  1,039 
Hamburg (W)  1,754  1304  1,746 
Other Länder  1,155  913  1,314 
Deutsches Reich  1,185  875  1,173 
  




Table A2: Summary statistics 
  
West sample  East Sample  year  variable 
Obs.  Per cent  Obs.  Per cent 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when unemployed 
(state=1)  6,104  63.24%  3,735  78.85% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when sick (state=1)  6,105  34.50%  3,728  52.76% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security of the family (state=1)  6,095  32.78%  3,732  49.06% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when old (state=1)  6,110  38.46%  3,737  56.09% 
1997 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when requiring care 
(state=1)  6,110  40.77%  3,737  56.44% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when unemployed 
(state=1)  5,307  65.33%  3,343  76.64% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when sick (state=1)  5,309  40.01%  3,345  51.81% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security of the family (state=1)  5,311  32.10%  3,347  45.65% 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when old (state=1)  5,319  36.70%  3,350  48.51% 
2002 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when requiring care 
(state=1)  5,313  44.27%  3,354  53.04% 
  
West sample  East Sample  year  variable 
Obs.  Per cent  Obs.  Per cent 
Life achievements determined 
by luck or effort (luck=1)  6,555  40.23%  4,070  31.40% 
1997 
Social conditions define 
possibilities (agree=1)  5,523  60.44%  3,465  72.41% 
  
Table A3: Summary statistics for the independent variables 
  
West sample  East Sample  year  variable 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
age   43.7  18.5  41.3  18.2 
college  10.4%    19.5%   
vocational training  52.9%    51.5%   
secondary schooling  15.7%    7.6%   
intermediate schooling  17.6%    17.7%   
male   47.9%    48.4%    
number of children  0.823  1.040  0.712  0.903 
number of adults  2.411  1.107  2.521  1.121 
married   60.8%    61.9%    
divorced   6.5%    6.6%    
married but separated  1.6%    1.2%    
widowed   7.6%    6.2%    
household income  4,914  2,431  4,069  1,897 
civil servant   4.8%    1.6%    
self-employed   4.8%    3.8%    
white-collar worker  24.7%    22.4%    
unemployed   3.6%    10.5%    
retired   15.9%    11.9%    
maternity   1.8%    1.6%    
nonworking   12.7%    9.4%    
training   3.1%    4.0%    
1997 
other nonworking  5.2%     4.9%    
age   46.9  17.8  44.5  17.3 
college  11.5%    20.6%   
vocational training  52.8%    54.5%   
secondary schooling  15.2%    7.1%   
intermediate schooling  15.2%    13.4%   
male   47.7%    48.8%    
number of children  0.788  0.988  0.576  0.818 
number of adults  2.193  0.939  2.286  0.898 
married   61.3%    56.7%    
divorced   6.8%    7.5%    
married but separated  1.5%    1.9%    
widowed   7.4%    6.4%    
household income  5,179  2,813  4,258  2,011 
civil servant   4.2%    1.8%    
self-employed   5.4%    3.8%    
white-collar worker  27.8%    23.6%    
unemployed   2.9%    9.0%    
retired   18.3%    14.9%    
maternity   2.2%    1.8%    
nonworking   10.6%    8.3%    
training   3.0%    4.2%    
2002 
other nonworking  5.0%     5.9%    
Note: Omitted categories are less than  9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and employed. 
  
Table A4: Average income per capita, unemployment rates, and transfers by states 
  
  
Average income per 
capita (in DM) 
Unemployment 
rates (in %) 
Transfers per capita            
(in DM) 
   1997*  2002  1997  2002  1997*  2002 
Berlin  28,830  28,528  17.3  16.9  2,922  3,020 
WEST             
Baden-Württemberg  32,621  34,843  8.7  5.4  -249  -305 
Bayern  32,011  33,895  8.7  6.0  -276  -325 
Bremen  35,588  37,231  16.8  12.6  3,912  3,458 
Hamburg  35,056  36,709  13.0  9.0  -172  -223 
Hessen  30,683  32,803  10.4  6.9  -559  -614 
Niedersachsen  30,149  31,473  12.9  9.2  285  319 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  32,198  34,168  12.2  9.2  -182  -176 
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland  29,625  31,329  11.0  7.6  720  649 
Schleswig-Holstein  31,178  31,655  11.2  8.7  132  278 
EAST             
Brandenburg  26,288  28,047  18.9  17.5  1,889  1,793 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  24,878  26,834  20.3  18.6  2,067  2,016 
Sachsen  25,867  28,099  18.4  17.8  1,912  1,893 
Sachsen-Anhalt  25,227  27,313  21.7  19.6  1,998  1,985 
Thüringen  25,338  27,941  19.1  15.9  2,015  1,954 
  
* Values adjusted for inflation. 
  
Table A5: Basic regression - ordered probit 
 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 




Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east   -0.378  0.024  -0.376  0.024  -0.349  0.024  -0.342  0.024  -0.307  0.024 
year02   -0.038  0.019  -0.151  0.020  -0.014  0.020  0.001  0.019  -0.090  0.020 
east*year02  0.102  0.030  0.137  0.030  0.031  0.029  0.122  0.030  0.157  0.031 
                       
age   0.016  0.013  -0.002  0.013  0.004  0.013  0.006  0.013  0.007  0.013 
age squared  (*10
3)  -0.367  0.253  -0.030  0.261  -0.133  0.258  -0.195  0.251  -0.063  0.259 
age cubed (*10
3)  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002  -0.000  0.002 
college  0.278  0.055  0.339  0.056  0.200  0.056  0.294  0.057  0.240  0.055 
vocational training  0.193  0.050  0.213  0.050  0.176  0.051  0.195  0.051  0.183  0.050 
secondary schooling  0.183  0.051  0.160  0.052  0.076  0.052  0.175  0.053  0.167  0.052 
intermediate schooling  0.171  0.058  0.146  0.059  0.155  0.059  0.131  0.060  0.144  0.060 
male   0.057  0.019  0.098  0.019  0.022  0.018  0.072  0.019  0.022  0.019 
number of children  -0.018  0.011  -0.027  0.010  -0.045  0.010  -0.027  0.010  -0.008  0.010 
number of adults  -0.016  0.010  -0.047  0.010  -0.029  0.010  -0.038  0.009  -0.008  0.010 
married   -0.036  0.031  -0.061  0.032  -0.006  0.031  -0.012  0.031  -0.084  0.032 
divorced   -0.084  0.043  -0.003  0.044  -0.055  0.043  -0.030  0.044  -0.083  0.045 
married but separated  0.065  0.067  0.026  0.068  0.034  0.066  -0.055  0.069  -0.139  0.069 
widowed   0.009  0.050  -0.032  0.049  0.018  0.049  0.047  0.048  -0.051  0.050 
log(household income)  0.129  0.022  0.234  0.022  0.135  0.021  0.217  0.022  0.144  0.022 
civil servant   0.114  0.048  0.203  0.049  -0.093  0.049  0.121  0.047  0.105  0.046 
self-employed   0.302  0.044  0.381  0.044  0.317  0.044  0.441  0.043  0.319  0.043 
white-collar worker  0.056  0.027  0.062  0.027  0.012  0.026  0.130  0.027  0.123  0.027 
unemployed   -0.113  0.037  -0.009  0.039  -0.119  0.037  0.008  0.039  0.024  0.040 
retired   0.027  0.047  0.090  0.050  -0.098  0.048  0.085  0.048  0.040  0.049 
maternity   -0.034  0.061  0.030  0.062  -0.099  0.056  0.162  0.060  0.116  0.062 
nonworking   -0.009  0.034  0.018  0.035  -0.147  0.034  0.026  0.034  0.000  0.035 
training   0.018  0.054  0.008  0.056  0.059  0.056  -0.002  0.054  0.022  0.056 
other nonworking  0.008  0.041  0.186  0.042  -0.048  0.043  0.058  0.043  0.088  0.043 
                       
obs  18,688    18,688    18,688    18,688    18,688    
log likelihood  -22,278     -21,857     -23,366     -22,695     -21,306    
Note: Ordered probit regressions. Omitted categories are less than  9 years of schooling, female, single, blue-collar worker, and employed. 
  
Table A6: Results of elections for the Bundestag, 1998 and 2002 
State  year     PDS  GRÜNE  SPD  CDU/CSU  FDP  others 
Berlin                 
  1998    13.4  11.3  37.8  23.7  4.9  8.8 
  2002    11.4  14.6  36.6  25.9  6.6  4.9 
WEST                         
Baden-Württemberg                 
  1998    1.0  9.2  35.6  37.8  8.8  7.6 
  2002    0.9  11.4  33.5  42.8  7.8  3.6 
Bayern                 
  1998    0.7  5.9  34.4  47.7  5.1  6.2 
  2002    0.7  7.6  26.1  58.6  4.5  2.4 
Bremen                 
  1998    2.4  11.3  50.2  25.4  5.9  4.7 
  2002    2.2  15.0  48.6  24.6  6.7  2.9 
Hamburg                 
  1998    2.3  10.8  45.7  30.0  6.5  4.7 
  2002    2.1  16.2  42.0  28.1  6.8  4.8 
Hessen                 
  1998    1.5  8.2  41.6  34.7  7.9  6.2 
  2002    1.3  10.7  39.7  37.1  8.2  2.9 
Niedersachsen                 
  1998    1.0  5.9  49.4  34.1  6.4  3.2 
  2002    1.0  7.3  47.8  34.5  7.1  2.2 
Nordrhein-Westfalen                 
  1998    1.2  6.9  46.9  33.8  7.3  4.0 
  2002    1.2  8.9  43.0  35.1  9.3  2.5 
Rheinland-Pfalz                 
  1998    1.0  6.1  41.3  39.1  7.1  5.4 
  2002    1.0  7.9  38.2  40.2  9.3  3.3 
Saarland                 
  1998    1.0  5.5  52.4  31.8  4.7  4.5 
  2002    1.4  7.6  46.0  35.0  6.4  3.7 
Schleswig-Holstein                 
  1998    1.5  6.5  45.4  35.7  7.6  3.3 
  2002    1.3  9.4  42.9  36.0  8.0  2.4 
EAST                         
Brandenburg                 
  1998    20.3  3.6  43.5  20.8  2.8  8.9 
  2002    17.2  4.5  46.4  22.3  5.8  3.8 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern                 
  1998    23.6  2.9  35.3  29.3  2.2  6.6 
  2002    16.3  3.5  41.7  30.3  5.4  2.8 
Sachsen                 
  1998    20.0  4.4  29.1  32.7  3.6  10.2 
  2002    16.2  4.6  33.3  33.6  7.3  5.1 
Sachsen-Anhalt                 
  1998    20.7  3.3  38.1  27.2  4.1  6.6 
  2002    14.4  3.4  43.2  29.0  7.6  2.4 
Thüringen                 
  1998    21.2  3.9  34.5  28.9  3.4  8.1 
   2002     17.0  4.3  39.9  29.4  5.9  3.6 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik 10/2002, p.827, Table 4.   